JUSTICE FOR IMPOVERISHED PROVIDERS
Justice is properly an issue, and to insulate one 'public' sphere from another.
Both idealized and relativized accounts of Justice look
inadequate from the perspective of those whom they marginalize.
Women, in particular poor women, will find that neither approach takes account of the reality of carrying both reproductive and Blindness to difference is a traditional image of Justice and guarantees impartiality. Yet principles of justice that are supposedly blind to differences of power and resources often seem to endorse practices and policies that suit the privileged.
Hence a demand that justice take account of context can seem equally reasonable. Justice, it is argued, needs more than abstract principles: it must guide judgements that take account of actual contexts and predicaments and of the differences among human beings. Relativized principles of justice meet this demand: but since they are rooted in history, tradition or local context, they will endorse traditional sexism or nationalism.
Any relativism tends to prejudice the position of the weak, whose Their communitarian critics want to take differences and 9 boundaries seriously in theory as well as in practice.
When boundaries are taken wholly seriously. however, international
Justice is not Just played down, but wiped off the ethical map.
Walzer's work is a good case in point. He holds that the largest sphere of Justice is the political community and that the only issues not internal to such communities are about membership in them and conflicts between them. The issues of membership concern the admission of individual aliens: rights and duties do 10 not go beyond borders.
A commitment to community is a commitment to the historical boundaries of political communities, whatever these happen to be and whatever injustices their constitution and their preservation cost. Communitarians cannot easily take any wider view of ethical boundaries since their critique of abstraction is in part a demand for ethical discourse that takes 11 'our' language, 'our' culture and 'our' traditions seriously. Abstraction, taken strictly, is simply a matter of detaching certain claims from others. Abstract reasoning hinges nothing on the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of predicates from which it abstracts. All uses of language must abstract more or less: the most detailed describing cannot dent the indeterminacy of language. Indeed it isn't obvious that there is anything to object to in very abstract principles of justice.
Highly abstract ways of reasoning are often admired (mathematics, physics), and frequently well paid (accountancy, law). What is different about abstract ethical reasoning? When we look at objections to 'abstract' ethical principles and reasoning in detail it appears that they are often objections not to detachment from certain predicates. but to the inclusion of predicates that are false of the objects of the domains to which a theory is then applied.
Reasoning that abstracts from some predicate makes claims that do not hinge on the objects to which the reasoning is applied satsifying that predicate. Reasoning that idealizes makes claims that hinge on the objects to which it is applied satisfying certain predicates. Where those predicates are unsatisfied the reasoning simply does not apply.
The principles and theories of Justice to which the critics of 'abstract liberalism' object are indeed abstract. They take no account of many features of agents and societies. However, these principles and theories not only abstract but idealize. or 'options' for approaching them. We beg questions if we assume that categories of thought that have been hospitable to male dominance and to imperialism can be decisive for discerning or judging Justice to those whose problems have been marginalized and whose agency and capacities have been formed, perhaps deformed, by unjust institutions. We cannot rely uncritically on the categories of established discourse, including the discourse of social scientists and of the 'helping' professions, to pick out the sigificant problems. These categories are themselves 23 matters for ethical concern and criticism.
We have, after If they are to be treated with justice, others who interact with them must not rely on these reduced capacities and opportunities to impose their will. Those who do so rely on unjust institutional structures that enable deceit, coercion and forms of victimization.
In applying abstract, non-idealizing principles we have to take account not indeed of the actual beliefs, ideals or categories of others, which may reflect unjust traditions, but of others' actual capacities and opportunities to act--and their incapacities and lack of opportunities. This move does net lead back to relativism: no principle is endorsed because it is actually accepted. Put in general terms we can use modal notions to identify principles, but indicative ones to apply them. The principles of justice can be determined for any possible plurality: for they demand only the rejection of principles that cannot be shared by all members of a plurality.
Judgements of the justice of actual situations are regulated but not entailed by these principles. The most significant features of actual situations that must be taken into account in judgements of justice are the security or vulnerability that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek change in variable aspects of the arrangements which structure their lives. 
